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ABSTRACT
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is probably the most popular public key systems
nowadays. The classic algorithm for computation of elliptic curve scalar multiplication
is Doubling-and-Add. However, it has been shown vulnerable to simple power analysis,
which is a type of side channel attacks (SCAs). Among different types of attacks, SCAs are
becoming the most important and practical threat to elliptic curve computation. Although
Montgomery power ladder (MPL) has shown to be a good choice for scalar multiplication
against simple power analysis, it is still subject to some advanced SCAs such like differ-
ential power analysis. In this thesis, a new number representation is firstly proposed, then
several scalar multiplication algorithms using this new number system are presented. It
has also been shown that the proposed algorithms outperform or comparable to the best
of existing similar algorithms in terms of against side channel attacks and computational
efficiency. Finally we extend both the new number system and the corresponding scalar
multiplication algorithms to high radix cases.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The Internet has an enormous impact on many aspects of our daily life. One of the great
advantage of Internet is that it makes data communication much easier. Accordingly, cy-
ber security gains people’s attentions more than ever. Among a variety of technologies
to provide cyber security, cryptography is probably the most important and effective one.
Cryptography can provide many security services, such like confidentiality and authentica-
tion. For instance, public key cryptography is well known for providing digital signature
and solving key distribution problems. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is considered the
most popular public key systems nowadays. The most demanded computation in ECC is
scalar multiplication.
However, there exist many kinds of attacks which can potentially compromise the secu-
rity of the cryptosystems. Besides the brute force attack, mathematical attacks and protocol
level attacks [1], side channel attacks (SCAs) [2] has become probably the most dangerous
threat to cryptosystems. SCAs utilize the information leaked from the physical implemen-
tation of a cryptosystem, rather than the weaknesses in the algorithms and protocols. The
leakage information includes timing information, power consumption, electromagnetic ra-
diation and sounds etc. By collecting and analysing these side channel information, an
attacker is able to launch the corresponding SCAs.
The classic algorithms to compute scalar multiplication is doubling-and-add algorithm.
Due to the unbalanced number of operations for different value of scalar bits, doubling-
and-add algorithm is vulnerable to the most basic SCA, simple power analysis (SPA) [3].
SPA involves that an attacker directly observes the power spectrum of a device on which
the cryptography algorithm is being performed. As an improved scalar multiplication algo-
rithm, MPL can resist to SPA since it has balanced number of operation all the time, thus
corresponding power consumption reveals no useful information about the algorithm.
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Recently, a few sophisticated SCAs have been proposed to against MPL, such as rel-
ative doubling attack [4], comparative power analysis [5] and Park’s fault attack [6]. For
example, comparative power analysis uses two related inputs to generate collisions for
MPL. A more recent algorithm described in [7] by Joye can successfully resist to the SCAs
proposed in [4] [5] but still shows weakness in resisting Park’s fault attack [6]. In this
thesis, we proposed new scalar multiplication algorithms which are shown more advanta-
geous over or comparable to the best of existing similar algorithms, in terms of resistance
to SCAs and computational efficiency.
1.2 Main Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows:
• A new binary number system, called Elevated binary number system (EBNS), is
proposed. Conversions between this new number system and the conventional binary
number is discussed. An extension of EBNS to high radix system is also presented.
• New left-to-right scalar multiplication algorithm using EBNS is proposed. This algo-
rithm shows advantage in terms of computation efficiency while maintains the same
security strength against SCAs compared to the best existing work. We also propose
five right-to-left algorithms using EBNS. Compared to the best existing work, all
proposed 5 algorithms have a advantage of not having a constraint condition. One of
the proposed right-to-left algorithm is able to resist Park’s fault attack [6] while all
other existing work can not.
• We propose one left-to-right algorithm using elevated high radix number system.
Compared to the best existing work described in [7], the main superiority of this
algorithm is to reduce complexity while not sacrificing the security strength. We also
propose three right-to-left algorithms. One of them can successfully resist to Park’s
fault attack while the existing work can not.
2
1.3 Thesis Organization
An organization of the rest of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 presents the background
of (ECC). A brief overview of existing works is given in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 proposes a
new number system, Elevated Binary Number System (EBNS). In Chapter 5, we propose
several scalar multiplication algorithms using new number system including binary cases
and high radix cases. Their comparison with existing work in terms of complexity and
security strength against side channel attacks are presented in this chapter. In Chapter 6,
the conclusion and possible future works are given.
3
2 Public Key Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks
2.1 Asymmetric Cryptography
Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses public and private
keys to encrypt and decrypt data. One key in the pair which can be shared with public is
called public key. The other key in the pair is kept secret named private key. Either of the
keys can be used to encrypt a message, while the opposite key is used for decryption.
Public key cryptography is addressed to provide two main security services: key dis-
tribution, which is used to exchange keys without having to trust a third party, and digital
signature, which is used to verify the intactness of a message from a claimed sender. There
are several public key cryptosystems which are frequently used currently, such as RSA
and ECC. Compared with symmetrical key cryptosystems, public key cryptosystems usu-
ally have higher computational complexity while provides unique security services, which
makes them indispensable in cyber security.
2.1.1 Elliptic curve cryptosystem and scalar multiplication
RSA and ECC are the most widely used and best known asymmetric cryptosystems. The
invention of RSA was in later 1970s at MIT, by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adle-
man [8]. And such cryptosystem is named after the first digit of their last names. The core
operation of RSA algorithm is modular exponentiation. Different from RSA, ECC has not
been patented. The suggestion of using elliptic curve in cryptography is first published
in [9] in 1985. Scalar multiplication is the main computation in ECC algorithm. Scalar
multiplication is very similar to modular exponentiation. On one hand, they both work
with cyclic group. On the other hand, since they share the similar computation structure,
they are subjects to similar SCAs. Because of the similarity, in the following of the pa-
per, we mainly focus on analysing scalar multiplication algorithms and the analysis can be
easily extended to modular exponentiation algorithms.
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Assume Alice wants to use ECC for communication. She needs to set up an ECC
system. It includes parameters of p,a,b,P,n,h,Q,d. First, she selects a prime p and elliptic
curve E with (a,b) over GF(p).
E : y2 = x3+ax+b, where a and b ∈ GF(p).
Second, she counts the points on E and let it be ]E(GF(p)). Then she selects a point P
of the maximal order n on E, which h= ]E(GF(p))/n. For public-private key pair (Q,d),
Alice needs to choose a secret number d ∈ [1,n−1]. Then computes scalar multiplication
Q= dP. Q is Alice’s public key, d is the private key.
In a scenario, Bob wants to send an encrypted message to Alice using ECC. Assume m
is the original message. He should choose a random number r, and computesC1 =m+ rQ,
C2 = rP. Then sends C1 and C2 to Alice. Upon receiving the message, Alice needs to
computes C1−dC2 = m to get the original message m.
From the computations mentioned above, we can see the core operations of ECC en-
cryption and decryption is point addition and point doubling based on elliptic curve. In
order to illustrate how to compute point addition and point doubling, we firstly assume an
elliptic curve:
E : y2 = x3+ax+b, where a,b ∈ GF(p).
Then let P1(x1,y1) and P2(x2,y2) be the two points on the curve.
Assume P3(x3,y3) = P1(x1,y1)+P2(x2,y1) 6= O. Then we can get
x3 = λ 2− x1− x2; y3 = λ (x1− x3)− y1;
where λ = y2−y1x2−x1 if P1 6= P2 and λ =
3x21+a
2y1
if P1 = P2.
2.2 Side Channel Attacks
The side channel attacks we consider are a class of physical attacks in which an attacker
tries to exploit physical information leakages such as timing information, power consump-
tion, or electromagnetic radiation [2].
Depends on what kind of leakage of system information SCAs relies on, we can cate-
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Table 2.1: Side channels and Corresponding Side channel attacks
Side Channels Information Side Channel Attacks
Power Consumptions
Simple Power Analysis,
Differential Power Analysis,
Comparative Power Analysis etc.
Timing information Timing attack
Faults response Safe-error Attacks
Other SCAs: Electromagnetic Radiation,
Sounds etc.
EM Attacks,
Acoustic cryptanalysis
gorized it into several types. The common types of leakage information and corresponding
side channel attacks are shown in Table 2.1.
2.2.1 Timing attack
When the running time of a cryptographic device is not constant, this time may leak in-
formation about the secret parameters involved, so that careful timing measurement and
analysis may allow an attacker to recover the system’s secret key. This idea was first ap-
peared in the scientific literature in 1996 [10].
Timing attack is practical in many cases. For example, in 2003, Boneh and Brumley
demonstrated a network-based timing attack on an OpenSSL-based web server running on
a machine in a local network. The attack was able to successfully recover a server private
key [11].
2.2.2 Powering analysis
Power analysis involves an attacker studies the power consumption of a cryptographic hard-
ware device (such as a smart card). It can be roughly divided in two types: simple power
analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA) [2].
In simple power analysis (SPA), an attacker directly observes a device’s power spec-
trum. It is known that the amount of power consumed by the device varies depending on
6
the data operated on and the instructions performed during different parts of an algorithm’s
execution [3].
Differential power analysis (DPA) is a more advanced form of power analysis which can
allow an attacker to compute the intermediate values within cryptographic computations by
statistically analysing data collected from multiple cryptographic operations [12].
2.2.3 Fault attack
Fault attack is a well known cryptanalysis method in which an attacker purposely induces
certain types of fault into a cryptographic device. Based on the correctness of outputs from
the device due to the injection of faults, an adversary is able to obtain certain knowledge of
the secret key which is embedded in the device [6]. These so-called fault attacks were first
described against public key schemes by Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton [13].
As illustration of the attack scheme, one of fault based attack mentioned by Sung Ming
Yen and Marc Joye is explained as follows. In [14] and [15], they describe the attack as
this: By timely inducing a fault during the execution of an instruction, an attacker may
deduce whether the targeted instruction is redundant. If the final result is correct then
the instruction is indeed redundant (or dummy operation [15]). If not, the instruction is
effective. This knowledge may then be used to obtain one or more bits of an exponent.
Such attacks are referred to as safe-error attack. Since safe error attack is able to check the
effectiveness of each operation, it is dangerous to have dummy operations in cryptographic
algorithms. More fault attacks can be found in [6] [16] [17].
2.2.4 Other side channel attacks
Electromagnetic attack (EM) is a side channel with a long history of rumors and leaks
associated with its use for espionage. It is well known that defence organizations across the
world are paranoid about limiting electromagnetic emanations from their equipment and
facilities and conduct research on EM attacks and defences in total secrecy [3].
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In the public domain, the significance of the EM side channel was first demonstrated
by van Eck in 1985 [18]. He showed that EM emanations from computer monitors could
be captured from a distance and used to reconstruct the information being displayed.
Acoustic cryptanalysis is a type of side channel attacks which exploits sounds emitted
by computers or machines. Modern acoustic cryptanalysis mostly focuses on the sounds
produced by computer keyboards and internal computer components, but historically it has
also been applied to impact printers and electromechanical cipher machines [19].
One obvious countermeasure is to use sound dampening equipment, such as a silent
keyboard. It can be a keyboard made of rubber, or a keyboard based on a touchscreen or
touchstream technologies. Recently, virtual keyboards have appeared that can be projected
on a flat surface or in the air [20].
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3 Overview of Existing Works
3.1 Doubling-and-Add Always Algorithms
The most classic algorithms to compute scalar multiplication is Doubling-and-Add algo-
rithms, which are presented as Alg. 3.1 and Alg.3.2. The first one computes from the most
significant bit, while the other one starts from the least significant bit.
Algorithm 3.1 Doubling-and-Add algorithm (left-to-right)
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (kh−1kh−2...k1k0)2, ki ∈ {0,1}
Output: R = kP ∈ E
1: x= P;
2: for i= h−2 down to 0 do
3: x= 2x;
4: if ki = 1 then
5: x= x+P;
6: end if
7: end for
8: The final value of x is x= kP.
We can see from Alg 3.1 and Alg 3.2, if ki equals to 1, there are two operations per-
formed, which are one doubling and one addition. If ki = 0, only one doubling operation is
computed. Since the number of operation varies from different value of key bits, the power
spectrum of performing this algorithm can certainly reveal the value of each key bit. So
doubling-and-add algorithms are obviously vulnerable to SPA.
Algorithm 3.2 Doubling-and-Add algorithm (right-to-left)
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (kh−1kh−2...k1k0)2, ki ∈ {0,1}
Output: R = kP ∈ E
1: x= O;
2: y= P;
3: for i= 0 down to h−1 do
4: if ki = 1 then
5: x= x+ y;
6: end if
7: y= 2y;
8: end for
9: The final value of x is x= kP.
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Square-and-multiply always algorithm as an improvement to against SPA was invented
by J. Coron in 1999 [21]. The algorithm which computes scalar multiplication has also been
developed. The left-to-right version of algorithm is shown as Alg 3.3. Dummy operation
is introduced in the algorithm to balance the number of operations for different value of
key bits. Though this algorithm resists to SPA, it’s still vulnerable to newer attacks such as
doubling attack [22] and C safe error attack [15].
Algorithm 3.3 Square-and-Multiply Always algorithm (left-to-right)
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (kh−1kh−2...k1k0)2, ki ∈ {0,1}
Output: R = kP ∈ E
1: x= O;
2: y= O;
3: for i= h−1 down to 0 do
4: x= 2x;
5: y= x+P;
6: if ki = 1 then
7: x= y;
8: end if
9: end for
10: The final value of x is x= kP.
3.1.1 Doubling Attack
Doubling attack was proposed in 2003 [22]. It’s so named since it is based on the doubling
operation in the scalar multiplication. Consider left-to-right version of doubling-and-add
algorithm as an example, the main idea of this attack is to compute kP and k(2P) at the
same time and compare the power spectrum of their doubling operations. As a result, we
can observe that if and only if the secret key bit ki equals to 0, the doubling operation
in iteration i+ 1 for compute kP is the same as in iteration i for compute k(2P). So if a
collision is detected, the information of ki = 0 can be obtained. This attack is also effective
to against square-and-multiply algorithms, in which the attacker chooses to compute me
and (m2)e instead.
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3.1.2 C Safe Error Attack
Another attack square-to-multiply always algorithm vulnerable to is C safe error attack.
It was proposed by S. Yen in 2002 [15]. It specifically targets algorithms with dummy
operations. The error an attacker injects to is a temporary random computational error. The
attack is so named as C safe error attack. We use Alg 3.3 as an example to illustrate how this
attack works in detail. If the attacker injects an error into the dummy operation y= x+P,
then this error will be ignored if the secret bit ki = 0. This is because the faulty result y will
not participate into the next operation x = y. As a result, the algorithm is correct and the
secret bit ki = 0 can be extracted. Otherwise, ki = 1 is obtained.
Even doubling attack and C safe error attack have been proven effectively against sev-
eral algorithms, they can be prevented by using a newer algorithm, Montgomery Powering
Ladder.
3.2 Montgomery Powering Ladder
Montgomery Powering Ladder (MPL) was initially invented as an improvement of square-
and-multiply algorithm towards SPA in 2003 [23]. As shown in Algorithm 3.4, it always
performs a multiplication followed with a squaring. Consequently, there is no difference in
power consumption regarding to compute different value of bits. Also, there is no dummy
operation in the algorithm, the error induced by C safe error attack would always cause
a faulty result. Thus, no useful information can be obtained to tell the value of key bits.
Moreover, the original doubling attack can not tell the value of key bits either.
Even MPL can resist to many SCAs, it is still vulnerable to some advanced side channel
attacks, such as relative doubling attack [24], M safe error attack [14], comparative power
analysis [5] and Park’s fault attack [6].
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Algorithm 3.4 Montgomery Powering Ladder
Input: M,N,e= (en−1en−2...e1e0)2, ei ∈ {0,1}
Output: C =Me mod N
1: R0 = 1;R1 =M;
2: for i= n−1 down to 0 do
3: if ei = 0 then
4: R1 = R0×R1; R0 = R02;
5: else
6: R0 = R0×R1; R1 = R12;
7: end if
8: end for
9: The final value of C is C = Me mod N.
3.2.1 Relative Doubling Attack
Relative doubling attack was proposed in 2006 to specifically attack Montgomery power
ladder [24]. The assumption of this attack is basically the same as what is in doubling
attack. The difference is that the relative doubling attack aims to derive the knowledge of
whether or not the key bits equal to each other but not the value of key bits directly. The
relative doubling attack is based on the following observations of MPL:
Let ∑t−1i=0 ei2
i be the binary expansion of exponent e. Defining L j = ∑t−1i= j ei2
i− j and
H j = L j+1. Then we have
L j = 2L j+1+ e j = L j+1+H j+1+ e j−1 = 2H j+1+ e j−2
Based on the above observation, we can obtain
L j = 2L j+1,H j = L j+1+H j+1,if e j = 0;
L j = L j+1+H j+1,H j = 2H j+1,if e j = 1;
Recall from the MPL algorithm, the operations of step 4 and step 6 are designed to be
as follows:
Equation 1: (R1 =MHi,R0 =MLi) = (MLi+1 ∗MHi+1,(MLi+12) if ei = 0;
Equation 2: (R0 =MLi,R1 =MHi = (MLi+1 ∗MHi+1,(MHi+12) if ei = 1;
It’s easy to observe two facts:
Fact 1. Given ei = 0, then we have Li = 2Li+1.
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Fact 2. Given ei = 1, then we have Hi = 2Hi+1.
From Equation 1, we understand that if ei = ei−1 = 0 then both
R0 =MLi
2: step 4 of iteration i−1 when evaluating Me.
R0 = (M2)
Li+1: step 4 of iteration i when evaluating (M2)e.
will perform the same computation because of Li = 2Li+1. Due to this observation
of collision on computation, a new doubling-like attack can be implemented to obtain the
knowledge of ei = ei−1 = 0.
From Equation 2, we also observe that if ei = ei−1 = 1, then both
R1 =MHi
2: step 6 of iteration i−1 when evaluating Me.
R1 = (M2)
Hi+1: step 6 of iteration i when evaluating (M2)e.
will perform the same computation because of Hi= 2Hi+1. This observation of collision
on computation leads to the knowledge of ei = ei−1 = 1.
It’s easy to understand that the collision of two computations will not reveal the value
of the operand. The only knowledge obtained is ei = ei−1, if a collision is detected. On the
other hand, ei 6= ei−1, if no collision is detected.
For example, we assume the private exponent e to be 75 = (1001011)2 and the two
related input to be Me and (M2)e respectively. Table 3.2 provides the details of computing
Me and (M2)e using MPL. Given e0 = 1, then step 6 of MPL algorithm will be calculated.
If we observe a collision of comparing doubling operation in iteration 0 for compute Me
and in iteration 1 for compute (M2)e, then we can obtain the knowledge of e0 = e1 = 1.
If no collision is detected, e0 = 1 is obtained. The idea of this attack is also applied to
MPL algorithm computes scalar multiplication. Instead of choosing Me and (M2)e, the two
related input data should be chosen as kP and 2(kP).
3.2.2 M Safe Error Attack
M safe error attack is the first published safe error based attack, which was proposed in
2000 [14]. In order to explain how the attack works in detail, we need to rewrite the
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Table 3.1: Computations of Me and (M2)e using Montgomery Powering Ladder
i ei Process of Me Process of (M2)e
6 1
R0 = 1×M;
R1 =M2
R0 = 1×M2;
R1 = (M2)2
5 0
R1 =M2×M;
R0 =M2
R1 =M4×M2;
R0 = (M2)2
4 0
R1 =M3×M2;
R0 = (M2)2
R1 =M6×M4;
R0 = (M4)2
3 1
R0 =M4×M5;
R1 = (M5)2
R0 =M8×M10;
R1 = (M10)2
2 0
R1 =M10×M9;
R0 = (M9)2
R1 =M20×M18;
R0 = (M18)2
1 1
R0 =M18×M19;
R1 = (M19)2
R0 =M36×M38;
R1 = (M38)2
0 1
R0 =M37×M38;
R1 = (M38)2
R0 =M74×M76;
R1 = (M76)2
Returen R0 =M75 R0 =M150
classic square-and-multiply algorithm first. The commonly used algorithm for computing
Me mod N where the exponent e is expressed in the binary form as e=∑n−1i=0 ei2
i. Suppose
that the modular multiplication R = AB mod N has to be preformed. Let ∑n−1i=0 ai2
i be the
binary expansion of A. Then, A can be recoded in radix 2t as ∑m−1j=0 A j(2
t) j instead. Hence
we can rewrite the product of A and B. Algorithm 3.5 shows the rewrite version of square-
and-multiply algorithm [14].
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Algorithm 3.5 Rewrite square-and-multiply algorithm
Input: M,N,e= (en−1,en−2 . . .e0)2
Output: A=Me mod N
1: A= 1;B=M;
2: for i= 0 to n−1 do
3: if ei = 1 then
4: R= 0;
5: for j from m−1 down to 0 do
6: R= (R2t+A jB) mod N;
7: end for
8: A= R;
9: end if
10: R= 0;
11: for j from m−1 down to 0 do
12: R= (R2t+B jB) mod N;
13: end for
14: B= R;
15: end for
The main idea of M safe error can be understood as follows: We can see from algorithm
3.5, if one or several errors are introduced into the more significant bit positions of register
A, after restoring the result R into A (step 8), no error will be detected if the faulty bits
belong to words A j are no loner required. For example, we assume that during iteration i,
an error is injected into word Ak. In the scenario that ei = 1 and the error is induced when
counter j of step 6 is less than k, then the faulty Ak will not affect the final result of R.
Eventually, after step 8, the faulty A will be cleared, Such kind of temporary error is called
a safe error. But in the scenario of ei = 0, the final result will be incorrect. Thus, we can
obtain the value of ei [14] [2].
M safe error attack is effectively against MPL too. Recall from Alg 3.4, suppose that
R1 is assigned as the multiplier. If ei = 0, two operations R1 = R0×R1 and R0 = (R0)2 are
performed. An error injected into the higher part of R1 is an M safe error, since the error in
register R1 will be cleared after the operation R1 = R0×R1. The error does not affect the
final result of the algorithm. If ei = 1, the error injected into R1 will cause a faulty result.
Based on these two distinct results, an attacker can recover the value of bit ei. It’s the same
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case of setting R0 as the multiplier.
3.2.3 Comparative Power Analysis
Comparative power analysis is a power analysis technique which was proposed in 2000 [5].
It can attack multiple algorithms including square-and-multiply algorithms, square-and-
multiply always algorithms, Sliding window methods and MPL.
It’s similar to doubling attack only more powerful, the basic idea is also to input a
chosen messages to generate collisions. Instead of choosing Me and (Me)2, The message
pair could be selected as (Me)α and (Me)β . We can see, if 2α = β , it can be seen as the
doubling attack. It’s the same case for MPL algorithm that computes scalar multiplication.
The message pair can be chose as αkP and βkP.
Fig.3.1 shows an example of comparative power analysis applied to MPL. Suppose the
attacker already knows the first four bits of the exponent e, which are (1100)2. Assuming
that ek−5 = 1, we use the value of R1(= Y 13) as the input of the squaring operation. Since
ek−2 = 1, the message pair Y 13 = Z2 is then selected to meet the condition. Compare the
power traces of the two shadow parts, if the results are identical, it means the assumption
is correct. otherwise, the assumption is wrong, which means ek−5 = 0.
3.2.4 Park’s Fault Attack
MPL is also vulnerable to Park’s fault attack which was proposed in 2009 [6]. The main
idea of this attack is to inject a fault into one loop of the algorithm and check the correctness
of the next loop’s result. The attacker is able to obtain the relationship of two adjacent secret
bits.
Take MPL as an example, the basic assumption is that the attacker can insert a fault dur-
ing the exponentiation operation and measure the power consumption traces. We also as-
sume that the attacker knows the power traces of multiplication R0×R1 mod N and squar-
ing R0×R0 mod N of every iteration loop i. There are two scenarios to inject a fault.
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Fig. 3.1: Example of comparative power attack against MPL
In the first scenario, we assume that an attacker injects a fault during the multiplication
computation R1 or R0 = R0×R1 of the loop i+1. Recall from algorithm 3.4, if ei+1 = 0/1,
then the intermediate value R1/R0 becomes a faulty one. The output of this scenario is
shown as Table 3.2. From the table, we can see if bit ei+1 = ei, the two power traces
of squaring operation in loop i will be the same. However, when the two key bits are
different, the attacker is able to observe difference between two power traces. As a result,
the attacker can obtain the knowledge of whether or not ei+1 equals to ei. More specifically,
if an attacker who knows the value of ei+1, he can obtain the value of next key bit ei by
observing the power differences in loop i.
In the second scenario, we assume that an attacker injects a fault during the squaring
computation R20 or R
2
1 of loop i+1. If ei+1 = 0/1, then intermediate value R0/R1 becomes
a faulty one. This fault model is independent of the multiplication step of the loop i+ 1,
and has the same assumption of fault type on the multiplication operation. The output of
this scenario is shown as Table 3.3. As we can see, if key bit ei+1 differs from ei, the two
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Table 3.2: Computation of modular exponentiation when a fault is injected in the squaring
operation
Secret key bit loop i+1 loop i
ei+1 ei Multiply Squaring Multiply Squaring
0 0
A fault is injected,
generate faulty value
Normal Error
Normal
0 1 Error
1 0 Error
1 1 Normal
Table 3.3: Computation of modular exponentiation when a fault is injected in the squaring
operation
Secret key bit loop i+1 loop i
ei+1 ei Multiply Squaring Multiply Squaring
0 0
Don’t care
A fault is injected,
generate faulty value
Error
Error
0 1 Normal
1 0 Normal
1 1 Error
power traces in the squaring operation in loop i will be the same. However, when key bits
ei+1 and ei are the same, the erroneous processing within squaring operation in the loop i
will generate some power differences between the two power traces. So an attacker who
knows ei+1 can also derive the next secret bit ei by observing the power spectrum in the
loop i.
3.3 Follow up Countermeasures on Exponent and Message Masking
3.3.1 Exponent Splitting
The idea of data splitting was first abstracted in [25]. And in [26], the idea was used
specifically on exponent. For modular exponentiation, the idea of splitting is to pick a
random r (smaller than e) and split e as r′ = e− r. Then the modular exponentiation can be
computed as me =mr+(e−r) =mr×me−r. The recovery process can be easily performed as
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S = Sr× Sr′ =Mr+r′ mod N =Me mod N. The weakness of this method is it doubles the
computation load and can be broke by high order attack [27].
3.3.2 High Orders Attack against Exponent Splitting
High Orders Attack was proposed in [27] by Frederic Muller and Frederic Valette. They
discovered some statistical properties of the exponent splitting. Then they used their dis-
covery to mount side channel attacks.
The properties can be understood as this: Ci =Ci⊕ ri⊕ r′i is always satisfied, where Ci
is the carry bit in i-th iteration and ri, r′i refer to the two split elements of exponent e. Pi is
defined as the probability for the case of Ci = 0 and Pr(ri,r′i) as the probability for bracket
case, we could have the probability transactions. From it, the bit-level probabilities of step
i can be derived from previous steps.
With this property in hand, an attacker can apply it with side channel attacks such as
fault attacks, safe error attacks and address-bit attacks to learn the secret exponent. Then
exponent splitting countermeasure is no longer secure.
3.3.3 Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation
Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation is also known as Masked Montgomery Powering
Ladder (Masked MPL). It was proposed in [26] by G. Fumaroli and D. Vigilant in 2009.
It is a message masking technique based on MPL. It’s shown as Algorithm 3.6. At the
beginning of the algorithm, two registers R0 and R1 are blinded by multiply a random
picked number r. Then all the intermediate values of R0 and R1 are masked by the element
r2
n−i
.
The register R2 is initialized with the anti-mask r−1 and such anti-mask is also updating
during each iteration process. Multiply R0 and R2 at the end of the algorithm will maintain
the correctness of the result. In addition, in order to thwart potential fault attack and expo-
nent or loop counter disturbance, an on-the-fly checksum function is performed to satisfy
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such purpose.
Other than resist to SPA, Masked MPL also successfully withstand differential power
analysis (DPA) and fault attacks. Unless the random number r is revealed, or it is a weak
mask, Masked MPL is considered secure. And thanks to the Checksum function’s partici-
pation, most fault attack cannot pass the very last sum checking. Failure in such checking
will cause the calculated results wiped. However this attack is vulnerable to template at-
tack, which is able to reveal the secret mask.
Algorithm 3.6 Masked Montgomery Powering Ladder
Input: M,e= (en−1en−2...e1e0); init(CKS)
Output: C =Me
1: Pick random number r
2: R0 = r;R1 = rM;R2 = r−1;
3: for i = n−1 down to 0 do
4: if ei = 0 then
5: R1 = R0×R1; R0 = R02; R2 = R22
update (CKS,ei);
6: else
7: R0 = R0×R1; R1 = R12; R2 = R22
update (CKS,ei);
8: end if
9: R2 = R2⊕CKS⊕CKSre f ;
10: end for
11: Return C = R0×R2.
3.3.4 Template Attack against Masked MPL
C. Herbst and M. Medwed proposed the template attacks in [28]. It has been proved that
it is effective to attack Masked Montgomery Ladder via guessing the value of random
mask [28].
Template attack can be seen as a advanced case of SPA. First, the attacker tries to obtain
the Hamming weights from obtained power traces. In this stage, DPA, probability model
multivariate normal distribution (MVN) and maximum likelihood (ML) decision rule are
used. Second, the attacker will filter out impossible operand values to recover an operand
of a multiplication or a squaring. It involves two steps. In the first sieving step, wrong
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candidates are filtered out. In the second step, the correct bit will be selected. Hence, the
mask will be revealed.
3.4 Sequence Masking
Sequence masking is another effective countermeasure to resist certain side channel attacks.
It usually changes the procedure of exponentiation methods. One example is Square-and-
Multiply-always method [21]. There is few work about sequence masking. since it’s diffi-
cult to change the computation sequence in an algorithm. carelessly modifying may dam-
age its correctness. Also, simply adding dummy operation may make the algorithm more
vulnerable. Nevertheless, sequence masking is a possible countermeasure of preventing
SCAs.
3.5 Combined Sequence Masking and Exponent Splitting algorithm
proposed by He
A highly secure algorithm which combines sequence masking and exponent splitting tech-
nique together was proposed by He in 2013. In [29], it shows that despite its high complex-
ity, the algorithm can successfully resist to all the side channel attacks mentioned above.
3.6 Joye’s m-ary Algorithms
There is another algorithm called highly regular m-ary powering ladders [7], which can be
seen as m-ary generalizations of Montgomery ladder. It was originally invented to compute
modular exponentiation in RSA. It can be easily extended to perform scalar multiplication
in ECC. Similar to MPL, this algorithm always repeat the same instructions in the same
order, without inserting dummy operations. It’s available in any radix m and in any compute
direction (left-to-right or right-to-left).
Joye’s m-ary algorithms derive highly regular exponentiation algorithms by considering
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a representation of e− 1 instead of the original exponent e. The m-ary algorithms can be
understood as follows:
Let e= ∑l−1i=0 eim
i denotes the m-ary representation of exponent e. Then
e= (el−1−1)ml−1+(∑l−2i=0(di+m−1)mi)+1;
The equation above can be rewritten as
e−1 = ∑l−1i=0 e∗imi;
where e= e∗i = ei+m−1 for 06 i6 l−2; e= e∗i = el−1−1 for i= l−1.
For the left-to-right algorithm which computes modular exponentiation in RSA is shown
as Algorithm 3.7, it makes use of an register A, initialized to ge
∗
l−1 . At each iteration of the
main loop, the register A is raised to the power of m and then always multiplied by ge
∗
i .
At the end of the main loop, the register is multiplied by g to get the correct result. The
corresponding algorithm that computes scalar multiplication is shown as Alg 3.8.
Algorithm 3.7 Joye’s m-ary left-to-right algorithm (RSA)
Input: Point g ∈ G, d = ∑h−1i=0 dimi, di ∈ {0,1, ...,m−1}
Output: gd
1: for i= 1 to m do
2: R[i] = gm+i−2;
3: end for
4: A= gdh−1−1
5: for i= h−2 down to 0 do
6: A= Am;
7: A= A×R[1+di];
8: end for
9: A= A×g;
10: The final value is A= gd .
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Algorithm 3.8 Joye’s m-ary left-to-right algorithm (ECC)
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (kh−1kh−2...k1k0)2, ki ∈ {0,1...m−1}
Output: kP
1: for i= 1 to m do
2: R[i] = (m+ i−2)P;
3: end for
4: A= (kh−1−1)P
5: for i= h−2 down to 0 do
6: A= mA;
7: A= A+R[1+ ki];
8: end for
9: A= A+P;
10: The final value is A= kP.
For the right-to-left algorithm, we have
ge−1 = ((gm)l−1)d
∗
l−1×∏m−1j=1 (L∗j)m+ j−2;
where L∗j =∏06i6l−2,e∗i= j g
mi .
The right-to-left algorithm uses m registers, R[1]...R[m] to keep track of the value of
L∗j and an accumulator that keeps track of the successive value of gm
i
. Same case as left-
to-right algorithm, at the end, one multiplication is needed as the correct step to maintain
the correctness of the algorithm. The m-ary right-to-left version algorithm is shown as
Algorithm 3.9. Corresponding algorithm performs scalar multiplication is shown as Alg
3.10.
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Algorithm 3.9 Joye’s m-ary right-to-left algorithm (RSA)
Input: Point g ∈ G, d = ∑h−1i=0 dimi, di ∈ {0,1, ...,m−1}
Output: gd
1: for i= 1 to m do
2: R[i] = 1G;
3: end for
4: A= g;
5: for i= 0 to h−2 do
6: R[1+di] = R[1+di]×A;
7: A= Am;
8: end for
9: A= Adh−1−1×∏mi=1R[i]m+i−2;
10: A= A×g;
11: The final value is A= gd .
Algorithm 3.10 Joye’s m-ary right-to-left algorithm (ECC)
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (kh−1kh−2...k1k0)2, ki ∈ {0,1...m−1}
Output: kP
1: for i= 1 to m do
2: R[i] = O;
3: end for
4: A= P;
5: for i= 0 to h−2 do
6: R[1+ ki] = R[1+ ki]+A;
7: A= mA;
8: end for
9: A= (kh−1−1)A+∑mi=1(m+ i−2)R[i];
10: A= A+P;
11: The final value is A= kP.
3.6.1 Joye’s Binary Algorithms
If m = 2, from high radix algorithms, we obtain the binary cases, in which the exponent
e ∈ {0,1}. Then e−1 = ∑l−2i=0 e∗i 2i with e∗i = ei+1. Also, el−1 is set to be 1. For the left-
to-right version, the algorithm computes modular exponentiation is shown as Alg 3.11 and
the corresponding algorithm computes scalar multiplication is presented as Alg 3.12. As
seen in Alg 3.11, register A is initialized to R[eh−2+1] and the loop starts at index l−3. In
each loop, there is always a squaring operation followed by one multiplication. Also there
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is a correction step which includes one multiplication at the end of the algorithm.
Algorithm 3.11 Joye’s binary left-to-right algorithm (RSA)
Input: Point g ∈ G, d = ∑h−1i=0 di2i, di ∈ {0,1}
Output: gd
1: R[1] = g;
2: R[2] = R[1]2;
3: A= R[dh−2+1]
4: for i= h−3 down to 0 do
5: A= A2;
6: A= A×R[1+di];
7: end for
8: A= A×R[1];
9: The final value is A= gd .
Algorithm 3.12 Joye’s binary left-to-right algorithm (ECC)
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (kh−1kh−2...k1k0)2, ki ∈ {0,1}, kh−1 = 1
Output: kP ∈ E
1: x = (kh−2+1)P;
2: y= 2P;
3: for i = h−3 down to 0 do
4: if ki = 0 then
5: x = 2x; x = x+P;
6: else
7: x = 2x; x = x+ y ;
8: end if
9: end for
10: x= x+P;
11: The final value is x = kP.
For right-to-left algorithm, the most significant bit is also set to be 1. In order to prevent
the final correction step, R[1] is initialized to be ge0 and R[2] to g. Then the loop can start at
index 1 instead of 0. At the end of the algorithm, one squaring and one multiplication are
needed to correct the final result. The algorithm computes modular exponentiation is shown
as Alg 3.13 and the corresponding algorithm performs scalar multiplication is presented as
Alg 3.14.
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Algorithm 3.13 Joye’s binary right-to-left algorithm (RSA)
Input: Point g ∈ G, d = ∑h−1i=0 di2i, di ∈ {0,1}
Output: gd
1: R[1] = gd0;
2: R[2] = g;
3: A= R[2]
4: for i= 1 to h−2 do
5: A= A2;
6: R[1+di] = A×R[1+di];
7: end for
8: A= R[1]×R[2]2;
9: The final value is A= gd .
Algorithm 3.14 Joye’s binary right-to-left algorithm (ECC)
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (kh−1kh−2...k1k0)2, ki ∈ {0,1}, kh−1 = 1
Output: kP ∈ E
1: x = k0P;
2: y= P;
3: z= P;
4: for i= 1 to h−2 do
5: if ki = 0 then
6: z= 2z; x= x+ z;
7: else
8: z= 2z; y= y+ z ;
9: end if
10: end for
11: z= x+2y;
12: The final value is z= kP.
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4 Proposed Elevated Binary Number System (EBNS)
4.1 Elevated Binary Number System Property
For an integer in EBNS of length k (there are k digits in the representation),
X = (xk−1xk−2...x1x0)2; where xi ∈ {1,2}
The maximal representable value is 2k+1− 2 and the minimal representable value can be
calculated as 2k− 1. So, the representation range of k digits for this new number system
is
[
2k−1,2k+1−2]. By contrast, the representation rang of k digits for binary number is[
2k−1,2k−1]. So, for the same value, EBNS representation needs one bit less than binary
number system.
For example, if we want to represent decimal number 27 in this new number system.
We can write it as (2211)2.
4.1.1 Convert between EBNS and Binary Number System
We also present the conversion algorithms between binary number system and EBNS. The
algorithms are shown as Algorithm 4.1 and 4.2. The main difference between EBNS and
binary number system is their digit set. We can consider that for EBNS, we use digit 1 to
replace binary digit 0 and replace binary digit 1 by 2.
Algorithm 4.1 Convert EBNS into Binary Number
Input: x = (xk−1xk−2...x1x0)2, xi ∈ {1,2}
Output: y = (ykyk−1yk−2...y1y0)2 yi ∈ {0,1}
1: xi−−; i= 0,1, ...,k−1;
2: y := (1xk−1...x0)−1;
3: The final value is y= (yk...y1y0)2 yi ∈ {0,1}
We can see from Alg 4.1 and Alg 4.2, when converting EBNS into binary number, only
one binary subtraction is needed. when converting binary number into EBNS, a binary
addition operation is performed. The architecture of these two conversions are shown as
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. They are both low-cost conversion. Because of the different
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Fig. 4.1: Architecture of converting EBNS into Binary Number System
digit sets, for the same value, EBNS representation is always one bit less than binary rep-
resentation. There is one unique situation, which is all the bits are 1. It’s the same case for
binary number and Elevated binary number. But it has no practical use. We can ignore this
situation.
Algorithm 4.2 Convert Binary Number into EBNS
Input: x = (xk−1xk−2...x1x0)2, xi ∈ {0,1}, xk−1 6= 0
Output: y= (...y1y0)2, yi ∈ {1,2}
1: y= (xk−2...x1x0)+1;
2: yi++; i= 0,1, ...,k−2;
3: The final value is y =(...y1y0)2 yi ∈ {1,2}
4.1.2 Conversion between EBNS and Decimal Number System
It’s easy to convert EBNS into decimal number system, we just need to calculate the value
of the elevated binary number. For converting decimal number into EBNS, we propose
Algorithm 4.3.
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Fig. 4.2: Architecture of converting Binary Number System into EBNS
Algorithm 4.3 Convert Decimal Number into EBNS
Input: x in decimal representation
Output: y = (yk−1yk−2...y1y0)2, yi ∈ {1,2}
1: i= 0;
2: while x 6= 0 do
3: y= x mod 2;
4: if yi = 0 then
5: yi = 2; x= x/2−1;
6: else
7: x= (x−1)/2;
8: end if
9: end while,
10: i= i+1;
11: The final value is y =(yk−1yk−2...y1y0)2
4.2 Elevated High Radix Number System
We further extend our elevated binary number system idea into high radix m, we propose
Elevated High Radix Number System. For an integer in Elevated High Radix Number
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System of length k (there are k digits in the representation),
X = (xk−1xk−2...x1x0)m; where xi ∈ {1,2, · · · ,m}
The maximal representable value is m(1−m
k)
1−m . and the minimal representable value can be
calculated as (1−m
k)
1−m . So, the representation range of k digits for this new number system is[
(1−mk)
1−m ,
m(1−mk)
1−m
]
.
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5 Proposed Algorithms using Elevated Number System
In this section, several algorithms compute scalar multiplication using our proposed new
number systems are proposed. Algorithms using EBNS are firstly presented. Then we ex-
tend the algorithms to high radix cases. We also show the proposed algorithms outperform
or comparable to the best of existing similar algorithms in terms of against side channel
attacks and computational efficiency.
5.1 Binary Representation
For left-to-right version of algorithm, we propose Algorithm 5.1. The correctness of this
algorithm is easy to prove. The core operation can be wrote as {x= 2x; x= x+kiP}. After
h−1 loops of computation, we can get the result of x= 2h−1x+2h−2kh−2P+2h−3kh−3P+
...+ k0P. Since x is initiated as kh−1P, final result x= kP is obtained.
For each loop, the core computation includes one doubling and one addition no matter
k equals to 1 or 2. Apparently, with this balanced number of operation for different value
of key bits, this algorithm can resist to SPA.
Algorithm 5.1 Scalar multiplication using EBNS (left-to-right)
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (kh−1kh−2...k1k0)2, ki ∈ {1,2}
Output: kP ∈ E
1: x= kh−1P;
2: y= 2P;
3: for i= h−2 down to 0 do
4: if ki = 1 then
5: x= 2x; x= x+P;
6: else
7: x= 2x; x= x+ y ;
8: end if
9: end for
10: The final value is x= kP.
For right-to-left algorithms, due to the different initiations steps and correction steps,
we propose five algorithms. The first one is shown as Algorithm 5.2. The main computation
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can be wrote as {z = 2y; x = x+(2− ki)y; x = x+(ki− 1)y; y = z;}. After computing
from loop 1 to loop h−1. the result of x is k0P+21k1P+22k2P+ ...+2h−1kh−1P. Since
x is initiated as O, we can obtain the final result x = kP. As seen from Alg 5.2, at the end
of each loop, register z needs to be assigned to y. The main computation in every loop also
includes one doubling and one addition. Apparently, Alg 5.2 resist to SPA.
Algorithm 5.2 Scalar multiplication using EBNS (right-to-left) version 1
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (kh−1kh−2...k1k0)2, ki ∈ {1,2}
Output: kP ∈ E
1: x= k0P;
2: y= 2P;
3: for i= 1 to h−1 do
4: if ki = 1 then
5: z= 2y; x= x+ y;
6: else
7: z= 2y; x= x+ z ;
8: end if
9: y= z;
10: end for
11: The final value is x= kP.
The second algorithm of computing from right to left is illustrated as Algorithm 5.3.
The main computation can be wrote as {x = x+ (2− ki)z; y = y+ (ki− 1)z; z = 2z;}.
So after the h− 1 loops of computation, the result of x is k0P+ 21k1P+ 22k2P+ ...+
2h−1kh−1P. Since x is initiated as O, the final result x = kP is obtained. We can see from
Alg 5.3, in each loop, there is one addition and one doubling, which can be computed in
parallel. There are three registers x,y and z which are initialized as O,O and P. A correction
step z= x+2y is needed at the end of the algorithm.
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Algorithm 5.3 Scalar multiplication using EBNS (right-to-left) version 2
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (kh−1kh−2...k1k0)2, ki ∈ {1,2}
Output: kP ∈ E
1: x= O;
2: y= O;
3: z= P;
4: for i= 0 to h−1 do
5: if ki = 1 then
6: x= x+ z; z= 2z;
7: else
8: y= y+ z; z= 2z ;
9: end if
10: end for
11: z= x+2y;
12: The final value is z= kP.
The third right-to-left algorithm is shown as Algorithm 5.4. The core computation is
the same as in Alg 5.3. It can also be calculated in parallel. Differ from Algorithm 5.3, the
correctness step at the end of Alg 5.4 is z= kh−1z+x+2y. There are h−1 loops in total. If
the most significant bit (MSb) is 1, the last correction step includes one doubling and two
additions. Otherwise, it contains two doubling and two additions.
Algorithm 5.4 Scalar multiplication using EBNS (right-to-left)version 3
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (kh−1kh−2...k1k0)2, ki ∈ {1,2}
Output: kP ∈ E
1: x= O;
2: y= O;
3: z= P;
4: for i= 0 to h−2 do
5: if ki = 1 then
6: x= x+ z; z= 2z;
7: else
8: y= y+ z; z= 2z ;
9: end if
10: end for
11: z= kh−1z+ x+2y;
12: The final value is z= kP.
Algorithm 5.5 is the forth right-to-left algorithm. It’s also similar to Alg 5.3, the main
computation is the same. The difference lie on the initialization step and correction step.
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In Alg 5.5, we initialize register x to k0P and register z to 2P. The correction step is
represented as z = kh−1z+ x+ 2y. There are two cases for correction step. If kh−1 = 1,
the correction step includes two additions and one doubling. Otherwise, it contains two
additions and two doubling. There are h−2 loops involved.
Algorithm 5.5 Scalar multiplication using EBNS (right-to-left) version 4
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (kh−1kh−2...k1k0)2, ki ∈ {1,2}
Output: kP ∈ E
1: x= k0P;
2: y= O;
3: z= 2P;
4: for i= 1 to h−2 do
5: if ki = 1 then
6: x= x+ z; z= 2z;
7: else
8: y= y+ z; z= 2z;
9: end if
10: z= kh−1z+ x+2y;
11: end for
12: The final value is z= kP.
The fifth right-to-left algorithm is shown as Algorithm 5.6. Register x, y and z are
initialized as k0P, O and P. The correction step at the end of the algorithm includes one
doubling operation and one addition operation. The main computation can be wrote as
{z= 2z; x = x+(2− ki)y; x = x+(ki−1)y; y= z;}. So after the last correction step, we
can obtain the final result x= kP.
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Algorithm 5.6 Scalar multiplication using EBNS (right-to-left) version 5
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (kh−1kh−2...k1k0)2, ki ∈ {1,2}
Output: kP ∈ E
1: x= k0P;
2: y= O;
3: z= P;
4: for i= 1 to h−1 do
5: if ki = 1 then
6: z= 2z; x= x+ z;
7: else
8: z= 2z; y= y+ z;
9: end if
10: z= x+2y;
11: end for
12: The final value is z= kP.
5.2 High Radix Representation
After propose algorithms compute scalar multiplication using EBNS, we extend the algo-
rithms to high radix cases. The left-to-right version of algorithm is shown as Algorithm 5.7.
m represents any high radix. As illustrated in the Alg 5.7, we initialize R[i] to iP for i from
1 to m and A to kh−1P. The main operations for every loop is A = mA; and A = A+R[ki].
There is no correction step needed in the algorithm.
Algorithm 5.7 Scalar multiplication using Elevated High Radix Number (left-to-right)
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = ∑h−1i=0 kimi, ki ∈ {1,2, ...m}
Output: kP ∈ E
1: for i= 1 to m do
2: R[i] = iP;
3: end for
4: A= kh−1P;
5: for i= h−2 down to 0 do
6: A= mA;
7: A= A+R[ki];
8: end for
9: The final value is kP= A.
For right-to-left algorithms using high radix m, we propose three algorithms. Version 1
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is shown as Alg. 5.8. For the initialization, R[i] is set to be OG for i from 1 to m and A to P.
The main computation is R[ki] = R[ki]+A; and A = mA. The correction step at the end of
the algorithm is A= ∑mi=1 iR[i]. It can be rewrote as
A= R[m];
For i= m−1 down to 1.
R[i] = R[i]+R[i+1];
A= A+R[i]
End for
Alg 5.9 is the rewrote algorithm of Alg 5.8.
Algorithm 5.8 Scalar multiplication using Elevated High Radix Number (right-to-left) ver-
sion 1
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = ∑h−1i=0 kimi, ki ∈ {1,2, ...m}
Output: kP ∈ E
1: for i= 1 to m do
2: R[i] = OG;
3: end for
4: A= P;
5: for i= 0 to h−1 do
6: R[ki] = R[ki]+A;
7: A= mA;
8: end for
9: A= ∑mi=1 iR[i];
10: The final value is kP= A.
The second version of right-to-left algorithm is shown as Alg. 5.10. It’s similar to Alg.
5.8. The initialization steps and main computations are the same. The difference is that
Alg 5.10 has one less loop and the correction step adds kh−1A. The correction step can be
rewrote as follows:
A= (kh−1)A;
A= A+R[m];
For i= m−1 down to 1.
R[i] = R[i]+R[i+1];
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A= A+R[i]
End for
Algorithm 5.9 Scalar multiplication using Elevated High Radix Number (right-to-left)
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = ∑h−1i=0 kimi, ki ∈ {1,2, ...m}
Output: kP ∈ E
1: for i= 1 to m do
2: R[i] = OG;
3: end for
4: A= P;
5: for i= 0 to h−1 do
6: R[ki] = R[ki]+A;
7: A= mA;
8: end for
9: A= R[m];
10: for i= m−1 down to 1 do
11: R[i] = R[i]+R[i+1];
12: A= A+R[i];
13: end for
14: The final value is kP= A.
The third right-to-left algorithm is shown as Alg. 5.11. We can see from the algorithm,
the main computation is X = X + kiY ; Y = mY , which can be computed in parallel. kiY is
the multiple results of point P. If we calculate and restore all the multiple results of point
P in advance, kiP does not need to be computed during the algorithm. The core operation
X = X + kiY can be seen as an addition, which is a great advantage in complexity reduce.
No correction step is needed in this algorithm.
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Algorithm 5.10 Scalar multiplication using Elevated High Radix Number (right-to-left)
version 2
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = ∑h−1i=0 kimi, ki ∈ {1,2, ...m}
Output: kP ∈ E
1: for i= 1 to m do
2: R[i] = OG;
3: end for
4: A= P;
5: for i= 0 to h−2 do
6: R[ki] = R[ki]+A;
7: A= mA;
8: end for
9: A= kh−1A+∑mi=1 iR[i];
10: The final value is kP= A.
Algorithm 5.11 Scalar multiplication using Elevated High Radix Number (right-to-left)
version 3
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = ∑h−1i=0 kimi, ki ∈ {1,2, ...m}
Output: kP ∈ E
1: X = OG;
2: Y = P;
3: for i= 0 to h−1 do
4: X = X+ kiY ;
5: Y = mY ;
6: end for
7: The final value is kP= X .
5.3 Security Analysis and Comparison
5.3.1 Binary Representation
In this subsection, we analyse our proposed binary algorithm’s security strength against
several side channel attacks and compared the results with existing works.
Since proposed Alg 5.1 has its feature of highly regular, which means it has balanced
number of operation for different value of key bits. It can certainly resist to simple power
analysis.
Doubling attack and comparative power analysis share the same principle of choosing
related inputs with the purpose of generating collisions, which has been discussed in detail
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in Section 3.2. However, for our proposed Alg 5.1, those two attacks have no use. In order
to perform a doubling attack, the attacker needs to compute kP and k(2P) at the same time
and compare their power traces of doubling operation to observe a collision. In Alg 5.1,
doubling operation is always performed before the addition operation no matter the secret
key bit equals to 1 or 2. So no collision will be detected. Table 5.1 shows the results of
computing scalar multiplication with input of kP = 49P and k(2P) = 98P using Alg 5.1.
We can see from the table, there is no collision generated. As a result, Alg 5.1 can resist
to doubling attack. It’s the same case for launching comparative power analysis. Even
we chose random input αkP and βkP, there is still no collisions generated since doubling
operation is always performed before the addition operation in the loop. Figure 5.1 is an
illustration for proposed algorithm against comparative power analysis, we assume the first
four digit of k is (1112)2 and the fifth digit is 1. Since k2 = 1, we select message pair of
4A = B. No matter k4 equals to 1 or 2, the shadow parts are always the same. There is no
way to obtain the value of k4. So Alg 5.1 can resist to Comparative Power Analysis.
Fig. 5.1: Example of comparative power attack against Alg 5.1
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Table 5.1: Computations of kP and 2(kP) using Proposed Alg 5.1
i ki Process of kP Process of k(2P)
4 2
x= 2P;
y= 2P;
x= 4P;
y= 4P;
3 1
x= 2x= 4P;
x= x+P= 5P;
x= 2x= 8P;
x= x+2P= 10;P
2 1
x= 2x= 10P;
x= x+P= 11P;
x= 2x= 20P;
x= x+2P= 22P;
1 2
x= 2x= 22P;
x= x+ y= 24P;
x= 2x= 44P;
x= x+ y= 48P;
0 1
x= 2x= 48P;
x= x+P= 49P;
x= 2x= 96P;
x= x+2P= 98P;
C safe error Attack is specifically attack algorithms with dummy operations. Since
proposed Alg 5.1 does not include dummy operation, this attack has no use toward Alg 5.1.
Proposed Alg 5.1 can also resist to M safe error attack. Recall from Section 3.2.2,
the main idea of M safe error Attack is to inject an error into a register, if the register is
restored afterwards, this attack can be seen as a safe error. Otherwise, it will result into
a faulty result. For Alg 5.1, all the intermediate results are restored into register x, so the
error injected into x will always cause a safe error. Then there is no way to distinguish the
secret key bits from 1 to 2. So Alg 5.1 is M safe error prevented.
Park’s fault attack is no threat to proposed Alg 5.1 either. Recall from Section 3.2.4,
the main idea of this fault attack is to insert a fault during the computation of loop i+ 1
and check the correctness of results in loop i to distinguish the secret key bit. For Alg 5.1,
all the intermediate results are stored into register x, so any fault injected in loop i+1 will
always lead to a faulty result in loop i. Then there is no way to distinguish the different key
bits.
High Order Attack is especially attack countermeasure of exponent splitting, so this
attack is not applicable to Alg 5.1. Also, Template Attack is aim to attack message masking
technique, it’s also not applicable to proposed algorithm. For the rest proposed algorithms,
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we will not analyse the security strength of proposed algorithms against these two attacks
two attacks, since they are not applicable to all of them.
According to the above analysis, the comparison results of existing and proposed al-
gorithm against Side Channel Attacks is presented in Table 5.2. As seen in Table 5.2, X
means the algorithm can resist to certain attack. while × indicates the algorithm is vulner-
able to the certain attack. Our proposed Alg 5.1 has the same security strength compared
to the best existing algorithm.
Table 5.2: Security against SCAs among Left-to-Right algorithms (Binary Representation)
Existing algorithms
Proposed
algorithm
D-a-A
Alg.3.1
D-a-A Always
Alg.3.3
MPL
Alg.3.4
Joye’s
Alg.3.12
Alg.5.1
Doubling
attack × × X X X
Relative
doubling attack × × × X X
Comparative
power analysis × × × X X
Fault attack × × × X X
M
safe-error × × × X X
C
safe-error × × X X X
We propose five right-to-left algorithms using elevated binary representation. For every
algorithm, we analyse its security strength against side channel attacks.
For Alg 5.2, since there is always a doubling operation followed by an addition in the
main computation, doubling attack and comparative power analysis have no use towards
this algorithm. C safe error attack is no use either, since there is no dummy operation
involved in Alg 5.2. Recall from M safe error attack, if we inject an error into register x,
the error will turn to be a safe error no matter ki = 1 or ki = 2. There is no way to tell the
value of ki. If the error is injected into y or z, the error will cause both faulty results for
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ki = 1 and ki = 2. So there is still no way to distinguish the secret key bits. As a result, Alg
5.2 is M safe error attack prevented. Alg 5.2 is able to resist Park’s fault attack too. Assume
the attacker injects a fault into the doubling operation in loop i, the addition operation and
the doubling operation in loop i− 1 will both result in faulty outputs. There is no way to
distinguish the secret key bit 1 from 2. If the fault is injected into the addition operation in
loop i, the results of doubling operation in loop i−1 will all be correct. While the results of
addition operation in loop i for both ki = 1 and ki = 2 are wrong. Still no way to distinguish
the secret bits. So it’s safe to say Alg 5.2 can resist to Park’s fault attack.
Alg 5.3, Alg 5.4 and Alg 5.5 share a lot similarities, the main computations are the
same, while the differences lie on initializations steps and correction steps. Due to their
similarities, We analyse their security against side channel attacks together.
First, recall from these three algorithms, the doubling operation of main computation
is z = 2z;, z will always double itself no matter ki equals to 1 or 2. Also it has nothing to
do with other registers like x and y. Then there is no way to generate collision by choosing
different inputs. So doubling attack and comparative power analysis cannot attack these
three algorithms. Second, C safe error attack has no use towards these three algorithms,
since no dummy operation is involved in these three algorithms. Third, M safe error has no
use towards these algorithms either, assume the attacker inject an error into register x. If
ki = 1, a safe error is generated. If ki = 2, the error will not be able to affect the correctness
of the result either. There is no way to tell the value of secret key bits. It’s the same case for
injecting error into register y and z. Unfortunately, these three algorithms are vulnerable
to Park’s fault attack. We use Alg 5.3 as an example, assume a fault is insert into addition
operation in loop i+1. The computation results is shown in Table 5.3.
We can see from the table 5.4, if a fault is injected into addition operation in loop i+1,
the doubling operation followed is normal. But for loop i, if ki+1 equals to ki, the doubling
operation is normal. Otherwise, the doubling operation will generate a faulty result. In this
way, the attacker can obtain the knowledge of whether ki+1 equals to ki or not.
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Table 5.3: Computation of Alg 5.3 when a fault is injected in the addition operation
Secret key bit loop i+1 loop i
ki+1 ki Doubling Addition Doubling Addition
1 1
A fault is injected,
generate faulty value
Normal
Error
Normal
1 2 Normal
2 1 Normal
2 2 Error
Table 5.4: Computation of Alg 5.6 when a fault is injected in the addition operation
Secret key bit loop i+1 loop i
ki+1 ki Doubling Addition Doubling Addition
1 1
Don’t care A fault is injected,
generate faulty value
Normal
Error
1 2 Normal
2 1 Normal
2 2 Error
Alg 5.6 is the fifth version of right-to-left algorithm. First, for the main computation,
there is always a doubling operation followed by an addition operation. Also, z always
double itself and has nothing to do with other registers. So, there is no way to generate
collisions by choosing different inputs. Then, this algorithm can resist to doubling attack
and comparative power analysis. Second, C safe error attack is still no use towards this
algorithm. Any error injected into register x,y and z will all result in a safe error. Then
there is no way to extract the value of secret key bit. So M safe error is no use either.
Unfortunately, Park’s fault attack can threat Alg 5.6. Assume a fault is injected into addition
operation of loop i+1. The computation results is shown in Table 5.4. We can see from the
table, if the addition operation in loop i generates correct results, we can obtain ki+1 = ki.
Otherwise, we can extract the information of ki is differ from ki+1.
According to the analysis above, the comparison results of existing and proposed right-
to-left algorithms against side channel attacks is presented in Table 5.5. As seen in Table
5.6, X means the algorithm can resist to certain attack. while × indicates the algorithm
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is vulnerable to the certain attack. According to the table, Proposed Alg 5.11 has the best
performance since it can resist to all the side channel attacks.
Table 5.5: Security against SCAs among Right-to-Left algorithms (Binary Representation)
Existing algorithms Proposed algorithms
D-a-A
Alg.3.2
Joye’s
Alg.3.14
Alg.5.2 Alg.5.3 Alg.5.4 Alg.5.5 Alg.5.6
Doubling
attack × X X X X X X
Comparative
power analysis × X X X X X X
Fault attack × × X × × × ×
M
safe-error × X X X X X X
C
safe-error X X X X X X X
5.3.2 High Radix Representation
Alg 5.7 is the left-to-right version of compute scalar multiplication using high radix m.
The security analysis of this algorithm is very similar to Alg 5.1. First, since the number of
operation is the same for different value of secret key bit, the algorithm can certainly resist
to simple power analysis. Second, the m-times operation A = mA is always performed
before the addition operation, there is no way to generate collisions by choosing different
inputs. Then comparative powering analysis can not threat this algorithm. Third, since all
the intermediate values are restored into A and there is no dummy operation involved, C
safe error and M safe error has no use towards this algorithm either. Last, any fault injected
into loop i+1 will always results in faulty output in loop i. So Alg 5.7 is Park’s fault attack
prevented.
Alg 5.8, Alg 5.10 and Alg 5.11 are the three versions of right-to-left algorithms. We
analyse the security of Alg 5.8 and Alg 5.10 together, since most parts of these two al-
gorithms are the same. First, the main computation always contains one addition and one
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m-times operation for any key bit, so these two algorithms can certainly resist to SPA. Sec-
ond, register A always m times itself during every loop, so comparative power analysis is
not a threat. Third, for any value ki, any error injected into R[ki] always results into a safe
error and any error injected into A always cause a faulty output. So, there is no way to
distinguish the secret key bits. M safe error is no threat either. Last, since the addition for
main computation is R[ki] =R[ki]+A, there is no guarantee the same R[ki]will be computed
in both loop i+1 and loop i. So, if any fault injected into loop R[ki+1] results into a faulty
output in loop i, then we can obtain R[ki+1] = R[ki]. So Park’s fault attack can successfully
attack these two algorithms.
The main computation of Alg 5.11 is X = X + kiY ; Y = mY , which can be seen as one
addition and one m-times operation. Apparently, this algorithm is SPA prevented. Since
register Y multiple itself during every loop, comparative power analysis is not a threat. No
matter what the value of ki is, any error injected into register X turns to be a safe error and
any error injected into Y will cause faulty outputs. So, M safe error attack cannot threat
this algorithm either. For Park’s fault attack, if a fault is injected into X in loop i+1, it will
cause addition operation in loop i a faulty result for all ki. If the fault is injected into Y ,
the addition and m-times operation in loop i will both be wrong for every key bit. So, this
algorithm can successfully against Park’s fault attack.
Based on the analysis before, Table 5.6 shows the comparison results of security strength
against side channel attacks between Joye’s m-ary algorithms and proposed algorithms.
From this table, we can see our proposed left-to-tight Alg 5.7 is as good as the existing
Joye’s m-ary algorithm. Proposed right-to-left Alg 5.11 can resist to all the side channel
attacks mentioned above, while Joye’s m-ary right-to-left algorithm is vulnerable to Park’s
fault attack.
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Table 5.6: Comparison against SCAs among High Radix algorithms
Existing algorithms Proposed algorithms
Joye’s m-ary
Alg.3.8
Joye’s m-ary
Alg.3.10
Alg.5.7 Alg.5.8 Alg.5.10 Alg.5.11
Doubling
attack X X X X X X
Comparative
power analysis X X X X X X
Fault attack X × X × × X
M
safe-error X X X X X X
C
safe-error X X X X X X
Table 5.7: Complexity comparison among left-to-right algorithms (Binary Representation)
Existing algorithms
Proposed
algorithm
D-a-A
(Alg.3.1)
D-a-A Always
(Alg.3.3)
MPL
(Alg.3.4)
Joye’s
(Alg.3.12)
Alg.5.1
# of loops L(k)−1 L(k) L(k) L(k)−2 L(k)−2
Constraint MSb=1 - - MSb=1 -
Correction step - - - One point add. -
# of Addition H(k) L(k) L(k) L(k)−1 L(k)−2
# of Doubling L(k)−1 L(k) L(k) L(k)−2 L(k)−2
5.4 Complexity Analysis and Comparison
5.4.1 Binary Representation
In order to compare the complexity of algorithms, we focus on 5 properties, which are num-
ber of loops, number of addition, number of doubling, algorithm constraint and correction
step. For left-to-right version of algorithms, we compare the traditional doubling-and-add
algorithm, doubling-and-add always algorithm, MPL, Joye’s binary case and our proposed
Alg. 5.1. Table 5.7 shows the comparison results.
L(k) shown in table 5.7 is defined as dlog2 ke. H(k) indicated the Hamming weight of
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Table 5.8: Complexity comparison among right-to-left algorithms (Binary Representation)
Existing algorithms Proposed algorithms
D-a-A
(Alg.3.2)
Joye’s
(Alg.3.14)
Alg.5.2 Alg.5.3 Alg.5.6
No. of
loops
L(k) L(k)−2 L(k)−2 L(k)−1 L(k)−2
Constraint - MSb=1 - - -
Correction
step -
One Dou.
One Add.
One Dou.
One Add.
One Dou.
One Add.
One Dou.
One Add.
No. of
Addition
L(k) L(k)−1 L(k)−2 L(k) L(k)−1
No. of
Doubling
L(k) L(k)−1 L(k)−2 L(k) L(k)−1
k. MSb represents the most significant bit of secret key bit k.
We can see from Table 5.7, compared to existing works, our proposed Alg. 5.1 has the
least number of loops, number of addition and number of doubling. Also, unlike Alg 3.9,
proposed Alg.5.1 does not have a constraint of MSb=1 nor correction step. It is safe to say,
proposed Alg.5.1 has the best complexity performance.
We also compare the right-to-left version of algorithms, which is shown as Table 5.8.
Since Alg 5.3, Alg 5.4 and Alg 5.5 share a lot similarities. We only pick Alg 5.3 to compare
with other algorithms since it has the best complexity performance. The correction step
of Alg 5.4 and Alg 5.6 have two possibilities since the MSb kh−1 could be 1 or 2. If
kh−1 = 1, the correction step includes one doubling and two addition. Otherwise, there
are two doubling and two addition. Accordingly, the number of addition and doubling are
variable.
We can see from Table 5.8, compared to the best existing work, Joye’s algorithm, all
proposed algorithms have an advantage of not having a constraint. Also, Alg 5.6 have the
same performance on number of loops, addition and doubling as Joye’s. Alg 5.2 has a
better performance compared to Joye’s algorithm since it has one less loop, addition and
doubling.
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Table 5.9: Complexity comparison among high radix algorithms
Joye’s algorithms Proposed Algorithms
L2R
(Alg.3.8)
R2L
(Alg.3.10)
L2R
(Alg.5.7)
R2L
(Alg.5.8)
R2L
(Alg.5.10)
R2L
(Alg.5.11)
No. of
loops
L(k)−1 L(k)−1 L′(k)−1 L′(k) L′(k)−1 L′(k)
Correction
step
Yes Yes - Yes Yes -
No. of
Addition L(k) L(k)+2m L′(k)−1 L
′(k)+
2m−2
L′(k)+
2m−2 L(k)
′
No. of
m-times
L(k)−1 L(k)−1
one (m−2)-times L
′(k)−1 L′(k) L′(k)−1 L′(k)
5.4.2 High Radix Representation
A complexity comparison of algorithms using high radix is shown in Table 5.9. Recall
from Alg 3.10, step 9 and 10 can be rewrote as
A= (kh−1−1)A
A= A+R[m];
for i= m−1 down to 1.
R[i] = R[i]+R[i+1];
A= A+R[i]
end for
A= A+(m−2)R[1];
A= A+P;
So for the correction steps, there are 2m+1 addition and one (m−2)-times operation. For
proposed Alg 5.9, the correction step can also be rewrote. It contains 2m additions.
We define L(k) in table 5.8 as dlogm ke. For traditional high radix number system, where
m ∈ {0,1, ...m−1}. The representation range of k digits is [0,mk−1]. For elevated binary
number system, the representation range of k digits is
[
(1−mk)
1−m ,
m(1−mk)
1−m
]
. So we can obtain
48
Table 5.10: Complexity comparison among high radix algorithms
Joye’s algorithms Proposed Algorithms
L2R
(Alg.3.8)
R2L
(Alg.3.10)
L2R
(Alg.5.7)
R2L
(Alg.5.8)
R2L
(Alg.5.11)
No. of
loops
L(k)−1 L(k)−1 L′(k)−1 L′(k) L′(k)
Correction
step Yes Yes - Yes -
No. of
Addition
L(k) L(k)+2m L′(k)−1 L
′(k)+
2m−2 L(k)
′
No. of
m-times
L(k)−1 L(k)−1
one (m−2)-times L
′(k)−1 L′(k) L′(k)
following facts:
L(k) = L′(k), when present value of
[
0,mL(k)−1
]
.
L(k) = L′(k)+1, when present value of
[
mL(k), m(1−m
L(k))
1−m
]
.
We can see from Table 5.9, proposed left-to-right Alg 5.7 has better performance than
Alg 3.8, since it does not need a correction step and has one less addition operation.
For right-to-left algorithms, Proposed Alg 5.11 has the best performance in complexity
since it has the lest number of addition and number of m-times operation. Plus, it doe s
not need a correction step. Proposed Alg 5.10 also has advantage in number of addition
compared to Joye’s Alg 3.10.
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Scalar multiplication using elevated high radix number (left-to-right)
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = ∑h−1i=0 kimi, ki ∈ {1,2, ...m}
Output: kP ∈ E
1: for i= 1 to m do
2: R[i] = iP;
3: end for
4: A= kh−1P;
5: for i= h−2 down to 0 do
6: A= mA;
7: A= A+R[ki];
8: end for
9: The final value is kP= A.
Scalar multiplication using elevated high radix number (right-to-left) version 1
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = ∑h−1i=0 kimi, ki ∈ {1,2, ...m}
Output: kP ∈ E
1: for i= 1 to m do
2: R[i] = OG;
3: end for
4: A= P;
5: for i= 0 to h−1 do
6: R[ki] = R[ki]+A;
7: A= mA;
8: end for
9: A= ∑mi=1 iR[i];
10: The final value is kP= A.
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Scalar multiplication using elevated high radix number (right-to-left) version 1
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = ∑h−1i=0 kimi, ki ∈ {1,2, ...m}
Output: kP ∈ E
1: for i= 1 to m do
2: R[i] = OG;
3: end for
4: A= P;
5: for i= 0 to h−1 do
6: R[ki] = R[ki]+A;
7: A= mA;
8: end for
9: A= R[m];
10: for i= m−1 down to 1 do
11: R[i] = R[i]+R[i+1];
12: A= A+R[i];
13: end for
14: The final value is kP= A.
Scalar multiplication using elevated high radix number (right-to-left) version 2
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = ∑h−1i=0 kimi, ki ∈ {1,2, ...m}
Output: kP ∈ E
1: X = OG;
2: Y = P;
3: for i= 0 to h−1 do
4: X = X+ kiY ;
5: Y = mY ;
6: end for
7: The final value is kP= X .
For an integer in EBNS of length k (there are k digits in the representation),
X = (xk−1xk−2...x1x0)2; where xi ∈ {1,2}
The maximal representable value is 2k+1− 2 and the minimal representable value can
be calculated as 2k−1.
So, the representation range of k digits for this new number system is
[
2k−1,2k+1−2].
By contrast, the representation rang of k digits for binary number is
[
0,2k−1]. So, for the
same value, EBNS representation needs one bit less than binary number system.
For example, if we want to represent decimal number 27 in this new number system.
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We can write it as (2211)2.
For an integer in elevated high radix number system of length k (there are k digits in the
representation),
X = (xk−1xk−2 · · ·x1x0)m; where xi ∈ {1,2, ...,m}
The maximal representable value is m(1−m
k)
1−m and the minimal representable value can be
calculated as (1−m
k)
1−m . So, the representation range of k digits for this new number system
is
[
(1−mk)
1−m ,
m(1−mk)
1−m
]
. By contrast, the representation rang of k digits for binary number is[
0,mk−1].
For example, if we want to represent decimal number 27 in this new number system
with m= 3. We can write it as (223)3.
Joye’s left-to-right algorithm (Binary case)
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (kh−1kh−2...k1k0)2, ki ∈ {0,1}, kh−1 = 1
Output: kP ∈ E
1: x = (kh−2+1)P;
2: y= 2P;
3: for i = h−3 down to 0 do
4: if ki = 0 then
5: x = 2x; x = x+P;
6: else
7: x = 2x; x = x+ y ;
8: end if
9: end for
10: x= x+P;
11: The final value is x = kP.
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Joye’s right-to-left algorithm (Binary case)
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (kh−1kh−2...k1k0)2, ki ∈ {0,1}, kh−1 = 1
Output: kP ∈ E
1: x = k0P;
2: y= P;
3: z= P;
4: for i= 1 to h−2 do
5: if ki = 0 then
6: z= 2z; x= x+ z;
7: else
8: z= 2z; y= y+ z ;
9: end if
10: end for
11: z= x+2y;
12: The final value is z= kP.
Input: Point P ∈ E, k = (11001)2
Output: x = 25P ∈ E
1: x= P;
2: k3 = 1; x= 2x;x= x+P; (Two operations)
3: k2 = 0; x= 2x; (One operation)
4: k1 = 0; x= 2x; (One operation)
5: k0 = 1; x= 2x;x= x+P; (Two operations)
6: The final value of x is x= 25P.
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6 Conclusions and Possible Future Works
6.1 Conclusions
In the thesis, a new binary number system, called Elevated binary number system (EBNS),
is proposed. Conversions between this new number system and the conventional binary
number is discussed. An extension of EBNS to high radix system is also presented.
Proposed Alg 5.1 is the new left-to-right scalar multiplication algorithm using EBNS.
Compared to the best existing work, it shows advantage in terms of computation efficiency
while maintains the same security strength against SCAs.
We propose five right-to-left algorithms. All of them have an advantage of not having
a constraint compared to the best existing work. Also, Alg 5.3 has the lowest number of
operations among all algorithms and it offers more security strength since it can resist to
Park’s fault attack while all existing work can not.
Proposed Alg 5.7 is the left-to-right scalar multiplication algorithm using elevated high
radix. Compared to the best existing work described in [7], the main superiority of this
algorithm is to reduce complexity while not sacrificing the security strength. We also pro-
pose three right-to-left algorithms. Among them, Alg 5.11 can resist to Park’s fault attack
while all existing works cannot and it also has a better performance in complexity since it
has less number of operations and does not have a constraint.
6.2 Possible Future Works
In the future, the research works presented in this thesis can be further extended in the
following aspects:
• Hardware implementation of proposed algorithms are expected to be accomplished.
• Algorithms that convert between elevated high radix number system and traditional
high radix number system will be developed. Along with their architectures.
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• All proposed right-to-left scalar multiplication algorithms have a correction step at
the end. This unique feature of algorithms may become a target to certain SCAs.
The next goal of our work is to restructure the algorithms in order to eliminate the
correction step.
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